First, we calculate eavesdropper's optimal information on raw bits in Bennett-Brassard 1984 quantum key distribution (BB84 QKD) scheme and six-states one in coherent attacks, using the method by Lo and Chau [Science 283, 2050[Science 283, (1999]. Next, we show that eavesdropper's optimal information in multiple-basis scheme is the same as that of six-states one. Then, we consider QKD without public announcement of bases [Phys. Lett. A 244(1998), 489]: we find that eavesdropper's optimal information in it is the same as that of a corresponding QKD with public announcement of bases. This fact suggests that QKD without public announcement of bases is as secure as BB84 scheme even in coherent attacks. 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Bz 
I. INTRODUCTION
Information processing with quantum systems is an exciting field both theoretically and practically. On its former sides, it might innovate our fundamental conceptions on our world [21] . On its latter sides, quantum information processing is superior to its classical counterpart in some cases: computing with quantum bits (qubit) enables factoring large numbers [2, 3] , which has remained intractable with classical computers and algorithms. In quantum key distribution (QKD) [5] - [26] , it is possible for two legitimate users Alice and Bob to distribute keys with security quantum mechanical laws afford.
Security of QKD had been widely believed on the basis of the no-cloning theorem [27, 28] and QKD might be the first practical quantum information processor [26] . However, it is only recently that its unconditional security is proved [22] - [25] . Since the original work [5] , more and more sophisticated attacks were considered: interceptresend strategy with orthogonal measurement in general bases, attacks with generalized (or positive operator valued) measurments, and the most general coherent (collective or joint) attacks where all qubits are coherently treated as a whole quantum system were considered in Ref. [12] , [13] - [18] , and [19] - [25] , respectively. One of the reasons making the proof complicated is that there are inevitable residual noise in real quantum channel. And natural noise cannot be discriminated from what Eavesdropper's (Eve's) tapping on the channel causes. Thus raw bits must be processed in such a way that Eve has essentially zero information about the final corrected bits. This might be done either quantum or classical information processing. In the former case, errors are removed by quantum error correcting codes or purification protocol [29] , which constitute basis of the security proof [22] - [25] . In the latter case, errors are corrected with certain classical error correcting codes [23] - [25] . In particular, in case of Ref. [25] classical error correction codes associated with Calderbank-Shor-Steane [30, 31] quantum error correctiong codes are used. The security of the method against coherent attacks are proven in Ref. [23] - [25] . However, before such elegant proofs were given, Eve's optimal information on raw bits for various attacks were estimated [12] - [17] for classical privacy amplification where Eve's information is removed. Although it is not proven such methods are secure against coherent attacks, it seems to be so for almost practical purposes and thus the security of such methods have been widely accepted. However, the estimations have been confined within individual attacks [12] - [17] . Estimating Eve's optimal information in coherent attacks was in itself an interesting and unsolved problem until Lo and Chau give a formula for it recently [22] . Thus it is worthwhile to do so. In this paper, first we calculate Eve's optimal information about raw bits in BB84, six-states schemes in the coherent attack using the formula. Next, we consider multiple-basis scheme where a number N (>> 1) of bases are adopted: we find Eve's optimal information in multiple-basis scheme is the same as that of six-states scheme. Then, we consider another variation of BB84 scheme, QKD without public announcement of bases [11] . We argue the formula can also be applied to it. We also find Eve's optimal information in it is the same as that of a corresponding QKD with public announcement of bases.
II. FORMULA FOR EAVESDROPPER'S OPTIMAL INFORMATION
The entanglement-bases schemes [7] can be reduced to BB84-like scheme [5] . Thus the optimal information in entanglement-based scheme which we calculate is the same as that in BB84-like scheme. First, we introduce entanglement-based scheme. With the convention of Ref. [29, 22] , the Bell basis vectors |Ψ ± (= |01 ± |10 ) and |Φ ± (= |00 ± |11 ) are represented by two classical bits 
where j k denotes the state of the kth pair, which runs from00 to11, α i1,i2,···,iN ,j 's are some complex coefficients, and the |j values form an orthonormal basis for the ancilla. Eve gives this state to Alice and Bob, the two legitimate participants who will exchange messages secretly. On each particle, they independently and randomly performs measurements amongŜ z (orthogonal measurement composed of two projection operators |0 0| and |1 1|),Ŝ x (that of |0 0 | and |1 1 |), and andŜ y (that of |0 0 | and 
This means that error rate D that Alice and Bob estimate from their measurements on qubits in z, x, and y basis are the same as they would have estimated using the Bell basis measurement [25] . So, we might as well estimate D using the Bell basis measurement. Then, let us consider the state. Assume that Eve had performed Bell basis measurement on all qubits in the state and then sent them to Alice and Bob. Then Alice and Bob perform Bell basis measurement on some subsets of the qubits, according to the scheme. After Eve did the pre-measurement, the state reduces to a mixed state
where
However, in our case Eve's and [Alice+Bob]'s measurements have common eigenvectors (the Bell basis), and thus Eve's pre-measurement do not change statistics of [Alice+Bob]'s later measurment. So it is sufficient for us to do our calculation for the mixed state [22] . Then, D for the state is given by the followings. 6) where 
1) where a,b,c,and d are the number of elements of the set
and D = {i k |i k =00}, respectively (k=1,2,...,N). We note that Eq.(3.1) is satisfied statistically only if Eve does not know the encoding bases while she has access to the qubits: if Eve know which pairs of particles will be chosen for estimation of the error rate D, she can cheat by sending Ψ − for all the chosen pairs while sending one of the four Bell states for other pairs. Then, in order to give an error rate D,
The number Ω of i 1 , i 2 , · · ·, i N s that satisfy Eq.(3.2) is given by
Among many summed terms, Ω is dominantly contributed by maximal (typical) one. Thus, we obtain
By inspection, we can see that the maximum is obtained when b = c. Then, with Eq.(3.2),
The maximum is obtained when the term's differential is zero or d = N D 2 .
Before comparing with I Eve for incoherent attacks (Eq.(65) of [17] ), our I Eve should be divided by 2N since it is the information about N pairs of particles. Then,
Eq.(3.7) is plotted in Fig.1 among others [10] in the same way: In the scheme [10] one of the three measurements
+ | is performed with equal probabilities. So we obtain
In order to give an error rate D,
Now, the maximum is obtained when
As we see in Fig.1, I Eve of Eq.(3.10) is lower than that of Eq.(3.8), which means that the six-states scheme is more advantageous than the BB84 scheme in the case of coherent attacks, too. Now, we address the multiple-basis scheme. In this scheme, many bases are adopted while two and three bases are adopted in the BB84 and six-states scheme, respectively. We assume the bases are uniformly distributed when represented on a sphere in a three dimensional Euclidean space. (Scheme with non-uniform distributions do not seem to be more advantageous than the uniform one.) However, we can show that this multiple-basis scheme is no more advantageous than the six-states scheme: let us compute the average probability p(a Bell state) that a Bell state induce parallel result when they are measured in one of the many bases uniformly distributed on the sphere. We can easily see that p(Ψ − ) = 0 since Ψ − induce only anti-parallel results for any basis. We can also see
where p(Φ − , θ) is the probability density that Φ − induce parallel results for a measurement along a basis that makes an angle θ with z axis and Ω is the solid angle. In a similar way,
Thus, for the multiple bases scheme we have the same equation as Eq.(3.9). Accordingly, the I Eve of this scheme is the same as that of six-states scheme. We can also consider a multiple-basis scheme where the bases are uniformly distributed in z − x plane. We can also show in a similar way that this multiple basis scheme in the plane is no more advantageous than the BB84 scheme:
IV. OPTIMAL INFORMATION IN QKD WITHOUT PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF BASES
Here we show that I Eve of QKD without public announcement of bases [11] is the same as that of a corresponding one with public announcement of bases. Let us consider one corresponding to BB84 scheme. In the scheme, Eve knows which and which pairs are encoded in the same basis while she does not know which basis between z and x they are. In this case the probability that Eve will make a right guess of the encoding bases is still 1 2 , which is the same as that in the case of BB84 scheme. Thus, Eq.(3.1) is also satisfied and later procedures for calculation of I Eve are the same as that of BB84 scheme. So, I Eve of QKD without public announcement of bases is the same as that of BB84 scheme. We note that the idea of QKD without public announcement of bases are easily applied to the six-states scheme. In this case, I Eve of this scheme is the same as that of the six-states scheme. However, if I Eve of both scheme are the same, we can say that QKD without public announcement of bases is more advantageous than BB84 scheme (or six-states scheme): while in BB84 scheme full information about the encoding bases are given to Eve after the quantum carriers have arrived at Bob, in QKD without public announcement of bases only partial information (which and which are the same basis) about the encoding bases are given to Eve.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
It is interesting that the sum of I Eve of BB84 scheme (Eq. (3.7) ) and This indicates something is conserved. Roughly speaking, QKD could be interpreted by the quantum information conservation: since the total quantum information that Alice have sent is conserved, the more quantum information Eve gets, the less quantum information given to Bob.
In conclusion, we have calculated eavesdropper's optimal information on raw bits in BB84 scheme and six-states one in coherent attacks, using the method by Lo and Chau. Next, we have shown that eavesdropper's optimal information in multiple-basis scheme is the same as that of six-states one. Then, we have considered QKD without public announcement of bases: we found that eavesdropper's optimal information in it is the same as that of a corresponding QKD with public announcement of bases in the coherent attacks. This fact suggests that QKD without public announcement of bases is as secure as BB84 scheme even in coherent attacks.
